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First Technology Safety Systems, Inc. v. Vector Research, Inc.,
11 F.3D 641 (6TH CIR. 1993).
Introduction
First Technology Safety Systems, Inc., a manufacturer of crash test dummies,
brought this copyright infringement action against its competitor, Vector Re-
search, Inc. The District Court for the Northern District of Ohio issued an ex
parte order for the seizure of allegedly infringing business records in order to
prevent the immediate and irreparable injury to the plaintiff. However, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the District Court abused
its discretion by entering the ex parte order.' According to the Appellate Court,
plaintiff failed to show that notice to defendants should not have been required,
that defendants would have concealed or destroyed the evidence if given notice,
and that no less extreme remedies were available.
Facts
First Technology Safety Systems, Inc. ("First") was the sole designer and
manufacturer of crash test dummies. First also held the copyright to the crash
test dummies, as well as to the related software programs and manufacturing
processes. Vector Research, Inc. ("Vector") was a corporation developed by for-
mer employees of First, and it was designed to compete with plaintiff in the
manufacture of crash test dummies.
First alleged that the Vector employees violated proprietary agreements signed
by the defendants while employed by plaintiff. Essentially, the agreements pro-
hibited disclosure of trade secrets and proprietary information both during and
after employment with First, and it also required the return of confidential infor-
mation to First after termination of their employment.
According to First, customer lists, customer contracts and other trade secrets
had been transferred to a computer media, which had been in the possession of
one of the defendants prior to terminating his employment with First. However,
that media could not be located when First filed its complaint. Thereafter, Vector
began contacting plaintiff's customers, customers whose identity could have only
been learned of via plaintiff's customer lists. Vector also produced a price list for
crash test dummies, calibration equipment, component replacement parts and data
acquisition software. According to First, such lists could not be developed and
implemented by a new corporation in less than two years. Thus, First alleged
that the information was obtained by defendants while in plaintiffs employ.
I. First Technology Safety Sys., Inc. v. Vector Research, Inc., II F.3d 641, 652 (16th Cir.
1993).
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First next claimed that evidence relevant to its allegation - that defendants
built their corporation using plaintiffs property - was in Vector's hands; and,
because business records were stored on computer media that are easy to destroy,
such items should be seized and impounded through an ex parte order. The Dis-
trict Court maintained that First had demonstrated the necessity to prevent imme-
diate and irreparable injury.2 Thus, it entered an ex parte order allowing plaintiff
and the United States Marshal to inventory and impound certain materials on
defendants' business premises, as well as allowing plaintiff to inspect, copy and
photograph all such seized materials.3 Defendants appealed the District Court's
ex parte order, as well as the court's dismissal of their motion to vacate that or-
der.
Legal Analysis
The issue before the Appellate Court was "whether the district court abused
its discretion in refusing to vacate its ex parte order, which permitted plain-
tiff.., to enter defendants' business premises and inventory and impound [cer-
tain allegedly infringing business documents]."4 Although Section 503 of the
Copyright Act5 states that the decision to order ex parte the impoundment of all
items infringing the plaintiffs copyright along with any means for reproducing
those infringing items is within the discretion of the District Court,6 the Appel-
late Court nevertheless maintained that the ex parte order was still unauthorized
by law.
The court first held that the order was too broad to fall within the parameters
of Section 503 of the Copyright Act, because it "permitted plaintiff to seize not
only computer software that allegedly infringed plaintiff's copyrights but also to
copy defendants' business records . . . " According to the court, Section 503
"only authorizes the impoundment of goods that infringe plaintiff's copyrights
and articles that can be used to copy those infringing goods."' Since the District
Court allowed First to copy Vector's business records, the Appellate Court held
that the order fell beyond the boundaries of Section 503. Vector's business re-
cords were not means by which defendants could have copied plaintiff's goods.
The court next noted that Section 503 is not meant as a means for preserving
evidence, rather it is a means to stop "the eventual destruction of items found at
trial to violate the copyright laws by safeguarding them during the pendency of
the action."9 Once again, the Appellate Court found the District Court's order
unauthorized by Section 503, since the seizure of Vector's business records was
merely to preserve evidence of defendants' wrongdoing, not to prevent the de-
2. Id. at 646.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 643-44.
5. 17 U.S.C. § 503 (1978).
6. First Technology, II F.3d at 647.
7. Id. at 649.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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struction of evidence violative of the copyright laws.
The court then reasoned that if the Copyright Act is inapplicable, Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 6510 must be applied by the lower court when granting injunc-
tive relief." Under Federal Rule 65, however, the only order the District Court
may enter ex parte is a temporary restraining order. Such an order requires that
"immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the appli-
cant... and the applicant's attorney certifies to the court.., the efforts...
which have been made to give the notice and the reasons supporting the claim
that notice should not be required."' 2
According to the court, the District Court would have been justified in order-
ing such a restraining order ex parte if notice to Vector was either impossible or
where "notice to the defendant would render fruitless further prosecution of the
action."'3 First did not contend that notice was impossible, since defendants
were not unknown or unable to be found; thus, First relied on the ground that
further prosecution would be fruitless without an ex parte order. Yet, according
to the court, asserting that Vector would merely dispose of the evidence if given
notice is not enough: To justify such an ex parte order, there must be "no less
drastic means for protecting the plaintiff's interests."' 4 The court reasoned, how-
ever, that the District Court could have sufficiently protected First by ordering
Vector not to disturb the items listed in the order and holding an immediate
hearing to determine whether the seizure order should issue.' Thus, less drastic
means existed to protect First.
Thus, First's only recourse was to "show that defendants would have disre-
garded a direct court order and disposed of the goods within the time it would
take for a hearing[, which would require plaintiff to show that defendants have] a
history of disposing of evidence or violating court orders... "6 The court
maintained that First's only justification - that it is business practice to store
business records on computer disks which, in turn, are easy to destroy - was
insufficient to proceed ex parte, because such a claim did not establish that Vec-
tor would, in fact, take such an opportunity to destroy the evidence or that it had
done so in the past.
Conclusion
The Appellate Court held that the District Court abused its discretion by or-
dering, and refusing to vacate, an ex parte order for seizure and impoundment of
defendants' business records and related items. According to the court, the lower
court was required to apply Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65, because neither
10. FED. R. Civ. P. 65.
11. First Technology, I 1 F.3d at 650.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 650-51.
17. Id. at 651.
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Section 503 of the Copyright Act nor the Copyright Rules authorized the ex
parte order issued by the District Court. The Appellate Court then held that un-
der Rule 65, plaintiff had made an insufficient showing as to why notice to de-
fendants should not have been required; that no less extreme remedies were
available; and that defendants would have concealed or destroyed the evidence if
given notice. Thus, plaintiff was not entitled to an ex parte restraining order, and
defendants were entitled to have all items taken from their business premises
pursuant to the District Court's ex parte order returned, subject to any safeguards
the District Court deemed necessary to prevent the items from being concealed
or destroyed.
Deborah A. LaGioia
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